Overview

By issuing Executive Order 10730 on September 24, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, where unruly crowds had prevented the desegregation of all-white Central High School. Not since the period of Reconstruction after the Civil War had federal troops gone to the South to maintain law and order. Many southern leaders angrily protested and said that the federal government was intervening in a matter for which state and local officials had exclusive responsibility. Even though Eisenhower’s executive order had the effect of advancing integration, the president was not a strong supporter of civil rights. Instead, he acted because the mob at Central High was interfering with a federal court order to carry out a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court about school desegregation. He declared, “There must be respect for the Constitution—which means the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution—or we shall have chaos” (qtd. in Galambos and van Ee, 2001, vol. 18, p. 322).

Context

Racial segregation and discrimination were common and ugly realities of American life when Eisenhower became president in January 1953. In most southern states, African Americans could not register to vote or serve on juries. Laws and customs barred African Americans from all-white restaurants, hotels, or swimming pools. Public schools were for blacks or whites only. In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that these racially separate facilities were constitutional, provided they were equal. Rarely if ever, however, were they equal. Outside the South, racial discrimination was also common, even though it was usually the result of long-standing practice rather than legal requirement. There were segregated schools in Kansas, Delaware, and Massachusetts, just as there were in Mississippi, Virginia, and Texas. In his first State of the Union address in February 1953, Eisenhower declared that “discrimination against minorities” was a national problem arising from the “persistence of distrust and of fear” (Eisenhower, vol. 1953, p. 30).

Executive Order 10730

National Archives and Records Administration

On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court struck a major blow against racial segregation in Brown v. Board of Education. In a unanimous ruling, the Court reversed the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson and declared that “separate but equal” schools were unconstitutional (qtd. in Pach and Richardson, p. 141). A year later, in May 1955, the court issued a second ruling, popularly known as Brown II, which called for the desegregation of public schools “with all deliberate speed” (qtd. in Pach and Richardson, p. 143). This instruction was confusing and contradictory, since “deliberate” contradicts “speed.” The language was the result of an uneasy compromise among the justices, who hoped that by not imposing a deadline for compliance, they would encourage communities with segregated schools to accept their decision and carry it out within a reasonable period of time.

Despite this hope, many white southerners were furious. On March 12, 1956, nineteen U.S. senators and seventy-seven members of the House of Representatives signed the “Southern Manifesto,” which condemned the Supreme Court for using “naked power” to intervene in a matter of states’ rights and called for the reversal of the Brown decision. The Southern Manifesto also asserted that the Court’s decision was “destroying the amicable relations between the white and Negro races that have been created through ninety years of patient effort by the good people of both races” (www.strom.clemson.edu). White citizens councils organized throughout the South to mobilize resistance to the Court’s ruling and to intimidate local officials who did comply. As a result, most local school boards emphasized “deliberate” rather than “speed.” They moved slowly, if at all, to desegregate all-white schools.

Little Rock, Arkansas, was one community that did comply, by preparing a plan for the gradual integration of its schools. In 1955 the local school board proposed to admit blacks to previously all-white schools in stages over a period of five to seven years. The first step would be the desegregation of Central High School in September 1957. The board members hoped that this plan for gradual action would satisfy African Americans, who wanted an end to racial discrimination, as well as most whites, who said they needed time to adjust to a major social change.

The plan, however, produced opposition. The local chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) filed a lawsuit to force more rapid integration of Little Rock’s schools. On August 28, 1956, a federal district judge ruled against the NAACP. A U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision on April 26, 1957. As the beginning of the school year approached, a local citizens council charged that “white and Negro revolutionaries” from the NAACP were responsible for the plan to desegregate Central High and threatened to “shed blood if necessary to stop this work of Satan” (Freyer, p. 81).

Governor Orval Faubus met secretly with the leaders of the citizens councils and decided to support them. Faubus had been a moderate on racial issues, and he said publicly that school issues were local matters. But he concluded that he could not win a third term as governor in 1958 without the support of white segregationists, whose voices were increasingly prominent in the aftermath of the Brown decisions. The governor maintained that he was concerned about the possibility of violence at Central High and so favored a delay in implementing the Little Rock desegregation plan. But after a judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas rejected that argument, Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to Little Rock. On September 4, the troops prevented the nine African American students who were supposed to start classes at Central High from entering the school.

The governor’s actions created a constitutional crisis. Faubus was a state official who had defied a federal court. Eisenhower informed the governor that he had taken an oath when he became president to defend the Constitution and would do so “by every legal means” available (Eisenhower, vol. 1957, p. 659). Eisenhower, however, wished to avoid a showdown. Although he believed in the principles of equal opportunity and equality before the law, he did not support the Brown decision. He thought that the Supreme Court, in trying to achieve “school integration,” might also cause “social disintegration” if white supporters of segregation resorted to violence (qtd. in Pach and Richardson, p. 143). He insisted that segregation and discrimination could not be eradicated by government action; what was necessary instead was a change in people’s hearts and minds. Because of this outlook, Eisenhower offered very limited support to the civil rights movement. Because of his commitment to gradual change, he wished to avoid a confrontation in Little Rock between federal and state authorities.

Faubus, too, sought a negotiated solution to the crisis. On September 14, he met with Eisenhower, who was vacationing in Newport, Rhode Island. The president knew that federal authority would ultimately prevail over state power, but he thought the crisis could be resolved more easily if Faubus avoided a humiliating, public defeat. He suggested that the governor change the orders of the National Guard from preventing desegregation to preserving public order at Central High. Faubus seemed to accept this solution but, after returning to Arkansas, decided instead to remove the National Guard from the school. Eisenhower was irate that Faubus appeared to have broken his word. The police in Little Rock were no match for the angry mob of over a thousand people that gathered at Central High on September 23. The mob forced the nine black students, who had entered through a side door, to return home because of the danger of violence. Later that day, Eisenhower released a proclamation requiring the members of these “unlawful assemblages” to “cease and desist.” But the next morning, an even larger mob surrounded Central High. Eisenhower then issued Executive Order 10730 authorizing the dispatch of federal troops to Little Rock.

Time Line

About the Author

Dwight David Eisenhower was born in Denison, Texas, on October 14, 1890, and grew up in Abilene, Kansas, where his family had moved only months after he was born. He graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1915, but his career as an officer in the U.S. Army began slowly. It took almost a decade until he gained recognition from his superiors. He served as a military aide in the 1920s to General John J. Pershing, the commander of U.S. forces in World War I, and in the 1930s to General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines. He returned to the United States in 1939, earned a promotion to brigadier general two years later, and then went to Washington, D.C., shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 to help in planning U.S. strategy in World War II.

During the war, Eisenhower led Allied forces to victory. He commanded the invasions of North Africa in 1942 and of Italy in 1943. As Supreme Allied Commander, he gave the order for the D-day invasion on June 6, 1944, that began the liberation of Nazi-occupied France. By the time he accepted the German surrender in Europe on May 8, 1945, he had become one of the greatest war leaders in American history.

After the war, Eisenhower served as army chief of staff (1945-1948) and president of Columbia University (1948-1950). In 1951, after the outbreak of the Korean War, he returned to active duty as the first commander of the armed forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1952, he decided to leave that command to campaign for the Republican nomination for president. He capitalized on his reputation as a war hero and his winning personality to win the nomination and the election in November. Millions of voters agreed with his campaign slogan: “I like Ike.”

As president, Eisenhower gave highest priority to fighting the cold war. He believed that the Soviet Union posed a threat not only to U.S. security but also to U.S. values and principles. To meet this global challenge, he increased U.S. nuclear strength, ordered the Central Intelligence Agency to overthrow governments in Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia that he considered hostile or dangerous, and launched a vigorous campaign to win the hearts and minds of peoples in the emerging third world nations of Africa and Asia to prevent them from turning to Communism. He agreed to an armistice in July 1953 that ended the fighting in Korea, and he was determined to avoid major wars that would strain the U.S. economy and weaken American efforts to contain Soviet influence. While making vigorous efforts to stop the spread of Communism, Eisenhower also hoped to improve Soviet-American relations and to curb the arms race between the two nations. He met with the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, in Geneva in July 1955—the first U.S.-Soviet summit since the end of World War II—and held two more meetings with the Soviet premier in 1959 and 1960. But the president’s hopes for a nuclear test ban treaty evaporated when the Soviets shot down an American U-2 spy plane over their territory on May 1, 1960, just days before Eisenhower and Khrushchev met in Paris.

In domestic affairs, the president’s approach was “middle-way Republicanism.” Eisenhower was a moderate conservative at a time when the Republican Party had many strong conservatives who wished to severely reduce or even eliminate programs for social welfare or regulation of the economy enacted during the New Deal of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945) or the Fair Deal of President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953). Although Eisenhower worried that “big government” programs might diminish individual freedom and personal responsibility, he also feared that political conflict and even social chaos might occur if the federal government did not provide for Americans in need. While Eisenhower was president, Social Security benefits were expanded to cover payments to disabled workers. In 1956 the president signed legislation that established the interstate highway system. In 1957 and 1960, Eisenhower approved new civil rights acts—the first such legislation since Reconstruction—and he also ordered an end to racial discrimination in federal facilities in Washington, D.C. But he opposed vigorous government efforts to end segregation in public schools or other discriminatory practices and instead favored gradual change.

Eisenhower was an extremely popular president. He easily won reelection in 1956, and his approval rating in the polls never fell below 60 percent. After leaving the White House in 1961, he retired to his farm at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. He died on March 28, 1969.

Explanation and Analysis of the Document

An executive order is an official directive from the president that has the force of law and that describes certain actions that members of the executive branch should take to enforce the law. Because it is primarily a legal document, an executive order usually lacks the inspiring language that a president might use in a speech to try to explain issues to the American people or to win their support for a program. Instead, it contains references to the specific legal basis for the president’s actions and precise instructions about how to carry them out.

Eisenhower begins with a reference to a proclamation he had issued the previous day about the riots that occurred after nine African American students entered Central High School in Little Rock. Once word spread that the students were inside the school, the mob became violent and attacked four African American journalists. School authorities sent the students home in the middle of the day so that they, too, would not become the victims of mob violence. Eisenhower issued his proclamation at the end of that harrowing day and also released a public statement. In the statement, he expressed his distress over the day’s “disgraceful occurrences” and pledged that he would not let a “mob of extremists” obstruct law and order in Little Rock. He also promised to use “the full power of the United States,” including “whatever force might be necessary . . . to carry out the orders of the Federal Court.” He added, however, “It will be a sad day for this country—both at home and abroad—if school children can safely attend their classes only under the protection of armed guards” (Eisenhower, vol. 1957, p. 689).

Eisenhower continues (paragraphs 2-4) by quoting the proclamation that explains the reasons for the action he is about to take. He uses precise, legal language in these paragraphs that begin with “whereas.” He makes clear that the crowd that had driven the nine African American students from Central High had not conducted a legitimate, legal demonstration. The Constitution guarantees the right to peaceful protest. What happened in Little Rock, however, was an “unlawful” assemblage that had engaged in “obstruction of justice.” Those who had participated in the mob that surrounded Central High had violated federal and state law, Eisenhower declares. Their actions had also denied to the black students the constitutional guarantee of “the equal protection of the laws.” That last phrase comes from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, adopted in 1868 and designed to ensure that African Americans, most of whom had lived in slavery until the end of the Civil War in 1865, would enjoy the rights of citizenship and “the equal protection of the laws.”

In paragraph 5, the president quotes the action that he had taken in the previous day’s proclamation. He refers to specific sections of the U.S. Code, a compilation of federal law. The sections that Eisenhower cites deal with the president’s authority to protect the rights of citizens in states where violations of law and order, such as domestic violence or insurrection, prevent the enforcement of federal or state law. Title 10, section 334 of the U.S. Code requires the president to issue a proclamation ordering those people who are obstructing justice through their violent actions to stop immediately. That is precisely what Eisenhower does when he commands those persons “to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse forthwith.”

Further action, however, was necessary. As Eisenhower explains in paragraph 6, his proclamation had not ended the mob violence at Central High. On September 24, the morning after he issued the proclamation, there were even more people at the Little Rock high school who were determined to prevent its desegregation. As a result, Eisenhower was taking further action on the basis of specific sections in the U.S. Code that he cites in paragraph 7. Section 332 gives him authority to use the armed forces to restore order. Section 333 provides authorization to act if state authorities “are unable, fail, or refuse” to ensure people’s constitutional and legal rights (caselaw.lp.findlaw.com). Because Faubus had not met his obligation to protect the rights of the African American students, Eisenhower was using his powers under federal law to do so. Throughout his executive order, the president uses the exact language of the sections of the U.S. Code on which he is relying.

In paragraphs 8-11, Eisenhower orders military forces to Arkansas. Their mission is to prevent interference with the U.S. district court order concerning Central High School. Eisenhower gives the secretary of defense the authority to rely on National Guard troops as well as units of the U.S. Army. The secretary used that authority to dispatch to Little Rock soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division, a combat unit that had served in the D-day invasion of Nazi-occupied France during World War II. The soldiers in the 101st Airborne left their base at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and arrived in Little Rock just hours after the president issued his executive order. Eisenhower places no time limit on the deployment of these troops; his executive order allows them to serve for “an indefinite period.”

Audience

Eisenhower wrote for both a limited and a large audience. His executive order was an official document that gave authorization to the secretary of defense and other government officials to dispatch federal troops and National Guard units to Little Rock to enforce the law. It was also a public document that informed millions of Americans—and people around the world—that the president was taking strong action to ensure compliance with the law. Eisenhower worried that the Soviets were exploiting the turmoil in Little Rock to gain a propaganda advantage in the cold war by arguing that the realities of American life fell far short of the ideals of freedom and equality. Extensive television and newspaper coverage of the vicious mobs in Little Rock made people around the world keenly aware of American racism. Eisenhower hoped that his executive order would help restore America’s tarnished image. The Voice of America broadcast news about the executive order and the deployment of troops to dozens of nations.

Impact

On the evening of September 24, Eisenhower gave a televised address to explain why he had issued his executive order. He said that he had no alternative to sending in troops because of the “disorderly mobs” led by “demagogic extremists” and the failure of local authorities to restore law and order. If he had not acted in these “extraordinary and compelling circumstances,” the result would have been “anarchy.” Eisenhower emphasized that the troops’ mission was not to speed integration but to make sure that “mob rule” would not “override the decisions of our courts” (historymatters.gmu.edu).

Eisenhower did not say that school desegregation was a matter of civil rights or equal rights. Instead, he complained that events in Little Rock had damaged America’s international prestige in the cold war competition with communism. “Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation,” he asserted. “We are portrayed as a violator of those standards of conduct which the peoples of the world united to proclaim in the Charter of the United Nations.” He called on the people of Arkansas to help in ending the trouble at Central High so that the federal troops could be withdrawn and the “blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation in the world will be removed” (Eisenhower, vol. 1957, pp. 689-694). While some Americans praised Eisenhower’s actions, there was also furious criticism. Faubus maintained that Arkansas was “occupied territory.” Senator Richard Russell, a Democrat from Georgia, claimed that the soldiers in Little Rock were using the same tactics as “Hitler’s storm troopers” (qtd. in Pach and Richardson, p. 154).

The troops restored order, but the situation did not return to normal at Central High during 1957-1958. Troops escorted the African American students to class. The soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division left Central High in late November, but National Guard troops under federal command remained until the end of the school year. The Little Rock Nine, as the black students were known, attracted international attention for their courage and commitment. In May 1958, Ernest Green, the only senior in the Little Rock Nine, became the first African American graduate of Central High.

Central High and all the other public high schools in Little Rock were closed during the 1958-1959 school year. The local school board asked for a delay of two years before continuing its desegregation plan. In Cooper v. Aaron the Supreme Court unanimously rejected its petition for delay on September 29. Faubus instead closed all four Little Rock high schools during 1958-1959. His decision helped him win reelection in 1958 and again in the next three elections. Eisenhower took no action to reopen the schools because there were no disorderly mobs or angry protests. Once more his goal was to preserve public order, not to promote integration. The Little Rock schools reopened in September 1959, and a few African American students attended two local high schools. Some parents, however, enrolled their children in a new, private all-white high school. The pace of school desegregation in Little Rock and in the South was extremely slow while Eisenhower was president. When he left the White House, less than 1 percent of African American students in the Deep South attended integrated schools. The percentage did not rise significantly until the last half of the 1960s.

It is ironic that Eisenhower used federal troops to enforce a court order concerning school desegregation. Eisenhower was not a vigorous supporter of civil rights. He had lived much of his life in states where racial segregation was common. Until the very end of his military career, the U.S. Army had separate black and white units. Eisenhower was uncomfortable in dealing with racial issues. He never spoke out in favor of civil rights as an urgent national issue; he thought the federal government had only limited powers to eliminate racial injustice. He was sympathetic to white southerners who said that advocates of equal rights under the law were demanding too much too soon. In the fall of 1956, when the governor of Texas used the National Guard to remove African-American students from previously all-white schools in Texarkana and Mansfield, Eisenhower condemned “extremists on both sides” but refused to take further action. When discussing civil rights at a news conference in July 1957—just weeks before the Little Rock crisis—Eisenhower declared, “I can’t imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to send Federal troops . . . into any area to enforce the orders of a Federal court, because I believe [the] common sense of America will never require it” (qtd. in Pach and Richardson, p. 150).

Still, by issuing his executive order, Eisenhower became the first president since Reconstruction to do precisely that. He took this step because he knew that he had taken an oath as president “to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.” Although he had reservations about the Brown decision, he understood that the Supreme Court was the final authority in interpreting the Constitution. Failure to abide by the Supreme Court’s decision would produce chaos. He issued the executive order not to promote desegregation but to insure that the order of a federal court and the laws of the land were faithfully executed.

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