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Privacy Rights in the Digital Age

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)

by Ethan P. Fallon

A unanimous decision, with a majority opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.

This case was a consolidated appeal, meaning that two separate but similar cases were heard at the same time by the U.S. Supreme Court. The decision applied equally to both cases.

In the first case, David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired vehicle registration tags. Once stopped, the officer discovered that Riley's driver's license had been suspended. Riley's vehicle was subsequently impounded while a different police officer conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. The search revealed that two handguns had been placed under the vehicle's hood. Riley was then arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms, in violation of California state law.

An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and discovered items associated with a street gang. The officer also took possession of Riley's cell phone, which Riley described as a “smartphone.” The officer then accessed the contents of the cell phone, observing additional indications of gang-related signs.

At the police station, two hours after Riley's arrest, a detective continued to investigate the contents of Riley's cell phone, searching for additional signs of gang activity. The detective discovered several photographs of Riley standing in front of a vehicle that authorities suspected was involved in a drive-by shooting that had occurred a few weeks earlier.

Riley was ultimately charged with, in connection with the drive-by shooting, firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder. Riley filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained from his cell phone, arguing that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court rejected his motion, and Riley was convicted on all three counts and received a sentence of fifteen years to life in prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed Riley's convictions, and the California Supreme Court denied Riley's petition for review.

In the second case, a police officer observed Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car. The officer arrested Wurie, and he was taken to the police station, where officers seized two cell phones that he was carrying. Officers soon noticed that one of the cell phones, a flip phone, was receiving several calls from the same source. Officers opened the phone and accessed its call log to determine the number associated with the phone calls. The officers then used an online phone directory to trace the phone number to an apartment building. The officers went to the apartment building, discovered Wurie's apartment, and secured the apartment while obtaining a search warrant. After executing the warrant, the officers found and seized 215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm, ammunition, and cash.

Wurie was charged with distributing crack cocaine, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. Wurie moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search, arguing that it was discovered based on an unconstitutional search of his cell phone. The district court denied the motion; Wurie was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 262 months in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the denial of Wurie's motion to suppress and vacated two of his convictions.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review both cases, specifically on the issue of whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who had been lawfully arrested.

Chief Justice Roberts first emphasized that the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis was reasonableness. Here, the two cases concerned the reasonableness of a warrantless search of a cell phone incident to a lawful arrest. Warrantless searches following a lawful arrest have been held constitutional, subject to the reasonableness standard, as discussed in a trilogy of cases, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

Chief Justice Roberts noted that, although warrantless searches following an arrest have been deemed reasonable, particularly where the officer's safety is at risk or where there is a concern of a loss of evidence, the scope of what is considered reasonable has been debated. In addition, past cases involved physical searches of objects, whereas the present case involved digital searches.

In deciding whether to exempt the search of cell phones absent a warrant, the Court balanced the degree to which a search intrudes upon an individual's privacy and the degree to which it is needed for a legitimate governmental interest. The Court held that officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting a search of data on a cell phone.

Chief Justice Roberts also noted that the digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to injure an arresting officer or to aid in a suspect's escape. Therefore, the rationale of a warrantless search based on officer safety is not applicable in these circumstances. Moreover, there was no risk of the defendants destroying any evidence in the cell phone because the officers had already secured the cell phones before they were searched. Thus, the officers could have obtained a warrant without risking the loss of evidence.

The government argued, however, that remote destruction of data or encryption methods could hinder an investigation if the cell phones were not immediately searched. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that several alternatives existed to prevent such destruction of evidence.

Chief Justice Roberts also discussed how cell phones differ significantly from other objects, and that an arrestee's diminished expectation of privacy does not foreclose all Fourth Amendment protections. Although “privacy comes at a cost,” the Court noted that exigent circumstances for warrantless searches are still available in extreme situations where quickly accessing cell phone data might be necessary.

The judgment of the California Court of Appeal was reversed, and the judgment of the First Circuit was affirmed.

While the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the warrantless searches of the defendants' cell phones were unreasonable, Justice Samuel Alito wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Alito voiced some doubts over the majority's approach to analyzing the search of digital evidence, but he also acknowledged that he could not conceive of a more workable alternative. Justice Alito also suggested that legislatures were better equipped to handle privacy concerns than were federal courts using the “blunt instrument” of the Fourth Amendment.

The decision in Riley demonstrates the U.S. Supreme Court's reluctance to apply Fourth Amendment rules mechanically to emerging technologies. Prior to Riley, nearly all searches incident to a lawful arrest were deemed reasonable. This decision lays an important analytical framework as courts continue to grapple with applying constitutional principles to rapidly evolving technology.

Further Reading

1 

“Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure—Searching Cell Phones Incident to Arrest—Riley v. California.” Harvard Law Review 128 (2014): 251–260.

2 

Pincus, Andrew. “Evolving Technology and the Fourth Amendment: The Implications of Riley v. California.” Cato Supreme Court Review 2014–2015 (2014): 307–336.

3 

Shoebotham, Leslie A. “The Strife of Riley: The Search-Incident Consequences of Making an Easy Case Simple.” Louisiana Law Review 75 (2014): 29–70.

See also: Cell phones; Constitutional law; Criminal justice (criminal procedure); Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Search warrants; Supreme Court of the United States

Citation Types

MLA 9th
Fallon, Ethan P. "Riley V. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)." Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, edited by Christopher T. Anglim & JD, Salem Press, 2016. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=PRDA_0183.
APA 7th
Fallon, E. P. (2016). Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). In C. Anglim & JD (Ed.), Privacy Rights in the Digital Age. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.
CMOS 17th
Fallon, Ethan P. "Riley V. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014)." Edited by Christopher T. Anglim & JD. Privacy Rights in the Digital Age. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2016. Accessed May 30, 2026. online.salempress.com.