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Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 2nd Edition

Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)

by Melissa A. Gill

Identification: An important case centered on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA). Chief Justice William Rehniquist delivered the majority opinion in the 7–2 decision. FERPA prohibits the federal government from funding educational institutions that release educational records to unauthorized persons, but the Supreme Court held that there is no private right that is enforceable.

The plaintiff was a student at Gonzaga University who planned on becoming an elementary school teacher after graduation. Under Washington State law, all new teachers require an affidavit of good moral character from the graduating college. Robert League, an employee of Gonzaga and a teacher in charge of certifying such affidavits, overheard a student, Julia Lynch, tell another student that “Jane Doe” was in obvious physical pain after the plaintiff raped her. Because of this overheard conversation, League launched an investigation into the matter and refused to certify the affidavit. In addition, he contacted the state agency responsible for teacher certification, identified the plaintiff by name, and discussed the allegations against the plaintiff with the agency. The plaintiff did not learn of these allegations, the investigation, or the discussion with the agency until much later, when he learned he would not be receiving the certification necessary to be a public school teacher. The plaintiff, “John Doe,” subsequently sued Gonzaga University and Robert League for defamation and violation of FERPA.

FERPA prohibits “the federal funding of educational institutions that have a policy or practice of releasing education records to unauthorized persons.” Congress enacted FERPA under its spending power because it conditioned federal funding on compliance with the act. The act specifies that the secretary of education enforce the act’s spending conditions and requires that the secretary establish an office and review board within the Department of Education for “investigating, processing, reviewing and adjusting violations of the Act.” (§1232 of the Act.)

The plaintiff argued that the statute confers upon any student enrolled at an applicable school the right to enforce the act, and specifically to seek damages under the act, under §1983. Section 1983 is also known as 42 U.S. Code §1983, or A Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights. It confers on individuals a right to bring civil suits against those that have violated their civil rights. In 1980, six years after Congress enacted FERPA, the Court agreed that §1983 actions may be brought against the state in order to enforce rights created by federal statutes as well as the Constitution. Specifically, the Court held that plaintiffs could recover payments that were wrongfully withheld by a state agency, in violation of the Social Security Act (Maine v. Thiboutot, 488 U.S. 1). A year later, however, the Court held that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 conferred no such right to private action, stating, “In legislation enacted pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds to the state” (Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 [1981]). The court reasoned that this does not grant any personal rights to enforce under the civil rights provisions of §1983 because the statute addresses only federal funding. Essentially, the Court has found that unless Congress has specifically, and unambiguously, given a private right, federal funding provisions alone do not provide such a right. The Court determined in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 239, that there were three factors to use when determining if a statute confers a private right: (1) Congress must have intended that provision to benefit the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff must demonstrate that the asserted right is not so vague that “its enforcement would strain judicial competence,” and (3) the provision granting the asserted right must be set forth in mandatory terms.

This Court stressed that they shall not “permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under §1983.” It emphasized that Section 1983 provides remedies only for the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities under the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court stated that there is a difference between rights and benefits and that here FERPA only confers a benefit.

The Court also stated that §1983 only provides a mechanism for enforcing rights secured elsewhere and that one cannot go into court and claim only a violation of §1983. The Court felt that, because FERPA speaks only in broad terms and directs the secretary of education to act, there is no private right.

Justice John P. Stevens and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg dissented, arguing that FERPA did, in fact, create private rights. The dissenting justices pointed to the fact that FERPA included ten subsections that not only created rights for parents and students but also detailed procedures for enforcing those rights. The justices felt that the statute clearly met the standards set forth in Blessing.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed an amicus brief that essentially agreed with the dissent, stating that the statute is clearly intended to benefit students and their families and that “[t]he right of confidentiality is expressed in concrete terms that are not so vague and amorphous as to strain judicial competence.” The ACLU also stressed that the obligation for schools to maintain confidentiality is mandatory, not optional. The ACLU also felt that the right of confidentiality for school records is important enough to provide a private cause of action and that such a cause of action is completely consistent with Congress’ goals in enacting FERPA.

Some scholars believe that the effect of this ruling is that it erodes rights under §1983. In addition, most believe that the Court in Gonzaga leaves too much ambiguity in interpreting §1983 cases, and some believe that the Court should rely more on legislative history when deciding if the statute has conferred a private right.

Further Reading

1 

Horner, Annie M. Gonzaga v. Doe: The Need for Clarity in the Clear Statement Test, 52 S.D.L.Rev 537 (2007).

2 

Mank, Bradford. Suing under §1983: The Future after Gonzaga v. Doe (2003). Faculty Articles and Other Publications. Paper 123. http://scholarship.law.uc.edu/fac_pubs/123.

See also: American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU); Educational setting, privacy in an; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA); Supreme Court of the United States

Citation Types

MLA 9th
Gill, Melissa A. "Gonzaga University V. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)." Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 2nd Edition, edited by Jane E. Kirtley & Michael Shally-Jensen, Salem Press, 2019. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=PRDA2e_0109.
APA 7th
Gill, M. A. (2019). Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002). In J. E. Kirtley & M. Shally-Jensen (Eds.), Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 2nd Edition. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.
CMOS 17th
Gill, Melissa A. "Gonzaga University V. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)." Edited by Jane E. Kirtley & Michael Shally-Jensen. Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, 2nd Edition. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2019. Accessed May 30, 2026. online.salempress.com.