Alfred Grosser has written a very interesting, if uneven, history of the Western Alliance from the uncertain days following World War II to 1977. The aftermath of great wars is always a time of instability since the balance of power has been altered in unpredictable ways. Sometimes the situation is clear enough and the actors astute enough that a firm peace can be established, as was the case in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. Other times, though, the variables are so confusing and the participants so swept along by currents of opinion which have their own momentum that solid relationships cannot be established. Such was the case with the Treaty of Versailles, which Marshal Foch described as “a twenty years truce.” Surely in 1945, very few would have anticipated the de facto settlement which emerged following Germany’s second bid at European hegemony. Yet, by virtue of the creation of the Western Alliance, one of the most enduring periods of peace and prosperity has occurred. No one can doubt that as long as the Western nations hold together in pursuit of common goals, security will be maintained. As Grosser makes abundantly plain, however, the Alliance is riven by rivalry, mistrust, and separate national interests.
The events leading up to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 are well known, and Grosser does not dwell on them. The interpretation of these events is still being debated, but Grosser basically believes that NATO was a necessary response to Soviet expansionism which was desired by the Europeans as much or more so than by the Americans. This admission is not easy for Grosser to make, for he is as influenced by French anti-Americanism, one of the major themes of his book, as those in charge of French policy, whom he criticizes from time to time. For a French anti-American to admit that the Alliance is necessary and in the interests of Western Europe is difficult for it takes the sting out of the contention that the Alliance is only a cover for America’s imperialistic ambitions in Europe.
The heart of Grosser’s book does not lie in the East-West confrontation, but in an examination of the relations among the partners in the Alliance. The emphasis on these various partners, as Grosser explains in his introduction, is not evenly distributed. The countries he knows best are France and Germany. England is a bit of an enigma to him; the United States is approached more as a myth than a reality; Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the others are only dealt with as they play an important role. Primarily, The Western Alliance is a description of French and West German relations with each other and with the, to them, strange country across the Atlantic to whom their destiny is tied. Here, too, a qualification should be made. Professor Grosser discusses the activity of the major politicians and opinion makers, along with an occasional public opinion poll, but makes little attempt to relate policy to underlying social structures or a thorough analysis of popular beliefs. While such information is obviously necessary, the author does have more than enough to do portraying the behavior of the important political actors of the Western countries during a period lasting more than thirty years.
From Grosser’s point of view, the dynamic of the Alliance has developed around three major themes: the French and German attitude toward the United States; the ongoing attempt to create a united European political unit; and interacting within this framework, the various events which have stimulated change—primarily economic developments and policy toward the Third World.
During the period from 1945 to 1950, England still enjoyed the prestige of its heroic struggle against Nazism and continued the special relationship it had formed with the United States during the war. Although lacking the means to implement American policy, English leaders were brought into American policymaking and in this role continued to play a major part in world events. Anglo-Saxon foreign policy during these years was directed toward strengthening Western Europe, and Grosser generally gives America high marks for its generous Marshall Plan aid. He also deemphasizes Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in European politics and believes rather that American attempts to encourage moderate democratic groups in France and Italy were carried out by legitimate, aboveboard means, using economic incentives and direct, high-level contacts.
The success of the Marshall Plan, however, produced a new dilemma, for by bringing Western Europe back to an economic par with the United States, a situation evolved in which the Europeans now wanted political equality. The tensions around these new demands, which have not been resolved, provide the main focus of the book.
England, whose economic progress in the 1950’s and 1960’s did not equal that of France and Germany, and who found it increasingly difficult to maintain the special relationship with the United States, retreated more and more into an isolationist position. This retreat left France and West Germany as the principal European powers. Each of these two countries has acted according to such different sets of assumptions, however, that unified action has been very difficult to achieve. This lack of unity has meant that, despite all the sound and fury, the United States remains the dominant partner in the Alliance.
France is saddled with a past and a self-image that make it hard to adjust to its contemporary position in the world. For three hundred years, from the Thirty Years War to 1940, France was either the leading or one of the leading powers in Europe. Furthermore, during these three hundred years, France developed a way of life, familiar to all visitors, making it feel it had achieved the ultimate in civilized living. The bloodletting of World War I, the defeat in 1940, and the rise of the Soviet Union and the United States have meant that France can no longer defend itself or intervene on a global level in a determinant manner. Yet, the French have been unable to relinquish either their attachment to the nation-state or their self-conception as a world power. The result has been both an obstructionist attitude toward the United States and an unwillingness to pursue European unity at the political level. As Grosser points out, this attitude, personified by General Charles de Gaulle, has always stopped short of the brink, and France remains a member of the Alliance and a participant in the European community.
Germany’s position is, if anything, even more difficult. West Germany labors under three burdens. The first is the burden of the Nazi past, which means that Germany’s acceptance in the international community is still insecure. The second burden is Germany’s division into two separate states, while the third is West Germany’s geographic position as the western country most exposed to Soviet aggression. The fact is that the foremost domestic goal, the reunification of the two Germanys, conflicts with the necessity to ward off the Soviet threat, which demands embedding West Germany more and more deeply into the Western Alliance and accentuating the division of Europe.
These three burdens have determined that Germany’s foreign policy is very different from France’s. After World War II, the Germans discovered that the return to international legitimacy lay with cooperation with the United States, for the Americans were far less hostile than the French and even the English, who had both suffered a good deal more at the hands of Germany. Thus, good relations with the United States have always been in the interests of West Germany. Second, the Germans recognize their dependence on NATO much more clearly than do the French, again accentuating the need for strong ties with Washington. West German foreign policy has consistently placed its relations with the United States as its dominant concern.
The German economic miracle, however, has complicated this configuration. By 1970, the German economy was out-performing the American, with the mark far stronger than the dollar, resulting for the first time in serious differences of opinion in Bonn and Washington. German economic strength also meant that, almost unwillingly, the Germans were being thrust more and more into the center of world events, because so much depended on how they managed their economic resources. Germany is slowly becoming independent of the United States, with the odd by-product that France, ever wary of its neighbor across the Rhine, is now beginning to value Washington more as a counterbalance to German strength.
These two national foreign policies were reflected in the third great movement Grosser describes—European unification. Interestingly enough, the prime force behind European unification has been extragovernmental, led by the Frenchman Jean Monnet. Attempted first on an economic basis in the 1950’s—and supported by the United States—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg came together in the European Coal and Steel Community, and then, in 1957, in the Common Market. Shortly thereafter, de Gaulle returned to power with his desire to assert France’s independence. At first, de Gaulle viewed the Common Market as a possible vehicle which he could use, on the condition that Germany would accept French leadership. The Germans, however, continued to view Washington as the principal ally, sabotaging de Gaulle’s vision. Attempts in the early 1960’s to establish supranational political institutions foundered. While Britain, Ireland, and Denmark have now been admitted to the Common Market, Grosser believes that the European countries have drawn ever further from the establishment of a supranational political unit. He continues to believe, however, that unity is the only path Europeans can take to regain the political influence to which their economic strength and culture entitle them.
With the dwindling hope of a united Europe, the Alliance is now a union of independent countries, and the accelerating squabbles over various national interests threaten to jeopardize its strength and common purpose. Economic problems are the source of many quarrels, especially now that inflation, high interest rates, balance of trade deficits, and unemployment grow ominous. Generally, everyone wants a currency structure which favors their own exports, inflation producing stimulation to take place in another’s territory and a tariff system which subsidizes one’s own products. There are no easy solutions, and the situation has been complicated by the rapid increase in oil prices which places heavy pressure on the weaker economies. The growing importance of the Middle East has meant foreign policy differences toward this vital area as everyone scrambles to ensure their own supplies. These sections make for sorry reading, but these same disputes exist within individual countries as well.
Policy toward the Third World has been characterized mostly by a tendency to take advantage of the difficulties of the others. Thus, the United States criticized England and France for their Suez invasion, without reinterpreting its own policy in Panama. John F. Kennedy denounced the French war in Algeria and then sent military advisers to Vietnam. The French, in turn, were only too glad to champion the underdog in that struggle.
Military strategy toward the Soviet Union has also been uneven, with an unwillingness to make the financial commitment necessary to build up conventional forces in Europe capable of stopping a Russian attack. The Western Alliance is in some disarray, yet for the foreseeable future, common political and economic systems among the North Atlantic countries and fear of the Russian model will keep together the organization which has done the most to create a stable world order in the years since World War II.