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Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition

Sinai, Israeli Invasion of (1956) (Suez Crisis)

In 1954, Egypt came under the control of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who dreamed great dreams for his nation: He wanted to modernize his country and make it the leader of the Arab world. To modernize Egypt, he proposed the construction of a dam on the Nile to bring hydroelectric power to his people and improve their living standards. To lead the Arab world, he proposed to make life difficult for Israel. In 1956 he set about accomplishing both these tasks.

The United States and Britain were interested in making money available to Egypt for the dam project, and worked with the World Bank to secure funds for Nasser. American President Dwight Elsenhower reconsidered the offer when he learned that Egypt had just contracted with Czechoslovakia, a communist state, to buy arms. Nasser had been sponsoring terrorist activity in Israel, and hoped with increased weaponry to have an army sufficient to defeat Israel. But if Nasser wanted to deal with communists, Eisenhower reasoned, he could not have American money for his dam. The United States withdrew its support for the project without first notifying the other party involved, Great Britain, which was also obliged to back out. Nasser responded quickly and shockingly. Was there not a ready source of income in Egypt already—the Suez Canal? Why should the British and French stockholders be making money on this waterway when it was within Egyptian territory? Nasser announced that Egypt would nationalize the canal.

Damaged tank and vehicles, Sinai War, 1956.

GHInv4e_p530_0001.jpg

Photo via Wiikimedia Commons. [Public domain.]

Britain and France did not care to lose income on a company they had owned since the 1870s, and they did not want to lose control of such a strategic waterway. If Egypt leaned toward the Soviet Union, Egyptian control of the canal could badly hurt European trade and troop movement. Moreover, France was upset with Nasser because of his support of revolutionaries in Algeria. On top of all of this, however, was the humiliation of being outdone by a Third World leader. The British and French wanted their canal back, and just when they needed a handy ally, one appeared: Israel.

The Israelis had long wanted to do something to stop the Egyptian harassment of their country, and they feared what Nasser might do with the new supply of weapons he had just acquired. Egypt had been blockading the Straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the branch of the Red Sea that reaches Israel’s southern border. Since all three countries wanted to hurt Nasser, they made common cause. If Israel would invade the Sinai Peninsula and drive for the Suez Canal, the British and French would give them aid. Once the invading Israelis approached the canal, the Europeans would recommend a United Nations resolution to keep both Israeli and Egyptian troops 10 miles from the canal. Then, Britain and France would volunteer to provide a peacekeeping force to guarantee that the canal stayed open. By coincidence, that would also put them in control again. If the United Nations or Egypt rejected the offer, the Europeans would invade and enforce their will. All of this planning was done in secret in Paris.

On 29 October 1956, Israeli troops went into action. They quickly drove down the west coast of the Gulf of Aqaba to seize the Egyptian post at Sharm al-Sheikh. They also landed parachute forces at Mitla Pass in preparation for an advance on the southern end of the Suez Canal, while an armored force was prepared to drive down the Mediterranean coast road to seize the northern end. When Egypt rejected Britain and France’s offer of a peacekeeping force and a halt of belligerents 10 miles on either side of the canal (which the Israelis were not yet near), the second phase of the plan went into operation. British and French aircraft bombed Egyptian airfields, and ships were en route with an amphibious force, which landed at Port Said on 5 November. In the meantime, Israeli troops overran Egyptian defenses along the coast road, though Egyptian forces put up a much stiffer resistance deeper in the Sinai.

The United Nations condemned the invasions but could do little to stop them; both Britain and France were able to veto any Security Council resolutions. The real pressure came from the United States and the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower privately and publicly accused the British and French of colonialism, and suggested an embargo of Latin American oil to slow the invaders down. The Soviet threat was more to the point: They were willing to commit “volunteers” to aid Egypt, and possibly target Paris and London with nuclear missiles. That the Soviets would start World War III over Egypt was hard to believe, but neither the British nor the French were willing to call their bluff. They withdrew. That left the Israeli army deep in Egyptian territory without the promised support, but they were loath to give up their gains. The United Nations committed a peacekeeping force to the Sinai Peninsula to protect Israel from further Egyptian incursions, and the Israelis achieved the security they wanted—at least until 1967, when the peacekeeping force was withdrawn. The British and the French got nothing but embarrassment and governments voted out of office. Nasser lost almost all his newly purchased weapons and saw his army badly handled by the Israelis, but he kept the canal and got Soviet money to build his dam. Because he seemed to have humbled the British and French, he was the big winner; he gained higher status in the Arab world, and was encouraged to keep planning actions against Israel. Relations between the United States and its allies were strained for some time, but Eisenhower’s refusal to support them in what could possibly have turned into nuclear holocaust was a wise move. The worst aspect for the Americans was their seeming cooperation with their archrival, especially since, concurrently with the Suez crisis, the Soviets were brutally suppressing a revolt in Hungary. To an extent, what this incident really proved was that Britain and France were not the powers they once were.

See also: Algeria, French Occupation of; Eisenhower, Dwight David.

References:

1 

Beaufre, Andre, The Suez Expedition, 1956, trans. Richard Barry (New York: Praeger, 1969); Bowie, Robert, Suez, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); Ovendale, Ritchie, Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars (London: Longman, 1984).

Citation Types

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MLA 9th
, . "Sinai, Israeli Invasion Of (1956) (Suez Crisis)." Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition, edited by Paul K. Davis, Salem Press, 2023. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=GHInv4e_0245.
APA 7th
, . (2023). Sinai, Israeli Invasion of (1956) (Suez Crisis). In P. K. Davis (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.
CMOS 17th
,. "Sinai, Israeli Invasion Of (1956) (Suez Crisis)." Edited by Paul K. Davis. Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2023. Accessed October 15, 2025. online.salempress.com.