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Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition

Egypt, Italian Invasion of

Since the Italian peninsula became unified into one country in the 1870s, they had harbored the desire to dominate the Mediterranean. When Benito Mussolini came to power in the early 1920s, he set about preparing the Italian military to accomplish this dream. It seemed logical to extend Italian power from its existing location in Sicily through to Tunisia, thus controlling the central Mediterranean. France, however, had a protectorate in Tunisia. That fact had driven the Italians into an alliance with Germany prior to World War I (which they withdrew from early in the war) and was the main motivating factor in Mussolini’s support of Hitler’s invasion of France in May 1940. Italian troops also invaded southern Italy, but the Germans were so successful in overrunning the country that Italy gained little control and could thus demand little in the way of spoils. The German-controlled Vichy government in the south of France maintained a tenuous hold on French colonies, in Africa and elsewhere.

Unable to take advantage of his Axis alliance to gain a stronger position in Africa, Mussolini turned toward Egypt, long protected by Great Britain. Using the Italian colony of Libya for a base, plus the southern position of Ethiopia that Italy had conquered in 1937, Mussolini had troops sufficient (he thought) to defeat the British. Early success against the badly outnumbered British in Somaliland confirmed this notion. Control of Egypt would not only give Italy dominance in the Mediterranean, it would give the Axis powers possession of the Suez Canal, a vital seaway for British supplies. Unfortunately for Italy, Mussolini was looking at Eastern Europe as well as Africa, and this split focus cost him in both regions.

Mussolini had some 200,000 troops in Libya, as opposed to only 63,000 British Commonwealth forces in Egypt, Palestine, and East Africa. Field Marshal Graziani’s invasion in September 1940 seemed destined for success. British General Archibald Wavell was a long way from the strategic or logistic decision center in London, so he had to make do with what he had on hand. It was enough. The Italian attack drove 60 miles into Egypt, reaching Sidi Barani. It was at this point Mussolini hurt himself. He launched an invasion of Greece at the same time as the Egyptian campaign opened. On the one hand, that forced a division in British interests which had long-range results, but it hurt the Italians more. Early November saw a series of Italian disasters. The British Royal Navy dealt a punishing blow to Italian naval forces at Taranto, the invasion of Greece bogged down in the face of the rugged Greek resistance and terrain, and Wavell launched a counterattack in Egypt.

Although Wavell’s attack was merely meant to recapture Sidi Barani, it was so successful he decided to exploit his advantage. The Italians lost 38,000 prisoners in this one engagement, and soon lost more. By February 1941, Wavell had captured the Libyan port of Tobruk and surrounded and captured the majority of the Italian army at Beda Fromm. Two months’ of campaigning netted the British 130,000 prisoners plus the destruction of 500 Italian tanks and the damage or capture of almost all their trucks and heavy guns. British losses totaled 2,000 men. Wavell proposed to march west and capture all of Libya, but this was not to be. With attacks on so many fronts, Prime Minister Winston Churchill could not spare any men or materiel. Instead, he ordered Wavell to set up a defensive position and send some of his forces to assist the Greeks. When Mussolini had suffered his reverses there, Hitler drove through Yugoslavia to aid him, and the Greeks were sorely pressed. That British diversion of men to a lost cause cost the Allies dearly in the African desert.

Not only did Hitler bail Mussolini out in Greece, he diverted two divisions under Erwin Rommel to assist in Libya. Rommel had proven himself to be an audacious leader of armored forces in the invasion of France, and he reinforced that reputation in Africa. Like Wavell, Rommel was ordered to hold a strong defensive position; also like Wavell, he took the opportunity to exploit a small victory. In March 1941, he quickly overran Wavell’s holding force and, forced to leave a besieging force at Tobruk, drove for Egypt. For the next year and a half, British and German forces drove back and forth along the coast of Cyrenaica, limited by the length of supply lines and what the respective governments deigned to send for supplies. They were also limited by the range of air cover: Halfway into Egypt the British could dominate from bases in Cairo and Alexandria, but halfway into Libya the Germans could dominate from Benghazi or Tripoli. Reaching those limits, usually timed with an arrival of reinforcements for the enemy, forced advances and withdrawals over the same ground in what came to be known as the “Benghazi Handicap.”

Wavell was removed from command, although it was the lack of support from home that hurt him, not his generalship. British forces continued to be pushed back, although their new commander, Sir Claude Auchinlek, received better support from Britain. Still, Rommel was on the offensive through most of 1941. In November, Auchinlek counterattacked an overextended Rommel and drove back into Libya, but a large German supply convoy in January 1942 stiffened the Axis forces and Rommel was back on the offensive immediately. Again the British spent the summer months going backward, and again Rommel reached the limits of his supply lines by the fall. The Nazi invasion of Russia drew so much attention, and therefore supplies, that Rommel was unable to maintain himself, though he was ordered never to retreat.

Churchill’s new commander in Egypt, Sir Bernard Montgomery, was in command when the climactic battle at El Alamein took place in September and October 1942. Rommel could not break through to Alexandria and was forced to withdraw in the face of a British counteroffensive.

This was the last leg of the Benghazi Handicap. Logistical superiority for the British, as well as the American invasion of North Africa in early November, put the Axis in the middle of a vise. By May 1943, the Allies controlled all of North Africa and used it as a base for further invasions to Sicily in July 1943 and Italy in September. The failed Italian invasion in September 1940 led to the country’s ultimate removal from Africa and the loss of its colonies. Never again could Italy mount offensive actions, and within six months of their defeat in Africa, they surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Even though the British did not lose Egypt militarily, they did abandon it as a protectorate after the war. Only French Algeria remained a European colony, but it was only a matter of time before that country, too, became independent. Egypt has undergone a number of political changes since, flirting with communism, pan-Arabism, and finally peaceful cooperation and attempts at national internal improvement. One of the longest-lasting legacies, however, is a byproduct of the nature of the war in the desert. Both the Axis and the Allies liberally used land mines, and as late as the 1970s an average of one person a day was still being hurt or killed by them.

See also: Ethiopia, Italian Invasion of; France, Nazi Invasion of; Italy, Allied Invasion of; Mussolini, Benito; North Africa, U.S. Invasion of; Sicily, Allied Invasion of; Soviet Union, Nazi Invasion of the.

References:

1 

Barnett, Corelli, The Desert Generals (London: Viking Press, 1960); Heckman, Wolf, Rommel’s War in Africa (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981); Jewell, Derek, ed., Alamein and the Desert War (London: Times Newspapers, 1967).

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MLA 9th
, . "Egypt, Italian Invasion Of." Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition, edited by Paul K. Davis, Salem Press, 2023. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=GHInv4e_0203.
APA 7th
, . (2023). Egypt, Italian Invasion of. In P. K. Davis (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.
CMOS 17th
,. "Egypt, Italian Invasion Of." Edited by Paul K. Davis. Encyclopedia of Invasions & Conquests, Fourth Edition. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2023. Accessed October 15, 2025. online.salempress.com.