Summary of Event
The Swiss Republic includes twenty-six districts or “cantons” not united by a common ethnic stock, language, or religion, nor by natural boundaries or ancient roots. The Roman Empire never organized the Transalpine Celts into a political entity. The Germanic invaders became the majority of a population divided into four ethnic and lingual groups—Alamanni , Franks , Italians , and Romansh .
During the breakup of Charlemagne’s empire, it would have been logical for these groups to be annexed by their German, French, and Italian neighbors, but this was forestalled by a thirteenth century central Alpine federative movement. Within the large and loose framework of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, three small mountain valley “forest cantons”—Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden—bordering the shores of Lake Lucerne, formed the alliance of rebels who fought at Morgarten.
The origins of the battle and of Switzerland must be told in terms of the geography, local history, and legends of the “inner Alps.” The thirteenth century brought significant changes to these forest cantons. Construction of the Devil’s Bridge over the Schoellenen Gorge on the Reuss River opened a trade route through the central Alps. Travelers and pack animals could go from Milan via Lake Maggiore, the Saint Gotthard Pass and Lake Lucerne to the Basle road, the Rhine, and Flanders. The formerly poor and isolated forest cantons began to prosper. At the same time, an increasing power struggle in the Holy Roman Empire saw emperors, their rivals, and the greater princes ready to sell charters for lands, political and tax rights, or privileges to wealthy nobles, towns, and peasant communities. The forest cantons now had the money to join the bidding. As early as 1231, the freemen of Uri purchased rent freedom from their Habsburg lord, as confirmed by imperial charter. By the 1240 Faenza Charter, the Schwyzois sought to escape dues or taxes to their Habsburg lord by payments to the emperor, a privilege not recognized by a later (Habsburg) emperor.
Ultimately, the Habsburgs were the threat against which the forest cantons would join in alliance. This family from the northwestern foothills of the Alps increased its feudal estates until by 1290 it held land, tax, or political rights in nine Swiss cantons, stretching from the Rhine through the Saint Gotthard Pass, in addition to sovereignty over Austria and Styria. Habsburg rents, taxes, tariffs, trade controls, and over-zealous bailiffs all seemed to threaten the local rights of the central Alpine burghers and peasants.
In August of 1291, Schwyz, Uri, and Unterwalden signed a written alliance. This alliance largely confirmed earlier agreements for settlement of disputes and mutual defense. No particular enemy was identified and no formal declaration of sovereignty was made, but the demand for native and freeborn bailiffs and judges was clearly aimed at Habsburg lordship, and the alliance itself was inherently an act of independence. Schwyz and Uri supported an anti-Habsburg coalition that was crushed at Winterthur on April 12, 1292, and related disorders may have been the context for the legendary midnight oath of rebellion supposedly sworn at Rütli meadow in 1307. Oral tradition seems to have embellished the roles of actual leaders such as Rudolf Stauffacher (Stoupacher) of Schwyz, and Werner von Attinghausen and Walter Fürst of Uri.
A greater complication is the legend of Wilhelm Tell, supposedly an oath-taker at Rütli, resistance leader, and warrior at Morgarten. The story of the bailiff’s hat, the apple shot from a son’s head on the tyrant’s command, the escape from the storm on Lake Lucerne, and the assassination of the bailiff sparking the war of rebellion were recorded only in the late fifteenth century “White Book of Sarnen,” polished a bit by Swiss historian Aegidius Tschudi in the sixteenth century, given historical context by Swiss historian Johannes von Müller in 1786, and popularized by Friedrich Schiller’s 1804 play and Gioacchino Rossini’s 1829 opera. Historians have pointed out that the apple story is a common northern tale, that the “Tell” version garbles actual history, that no fourteenth century chronicler mentions such a hero, and that “Tell” is really a Swiss equivalent to the legendary figures Robin Hood or Paul Bunyan. Some Swiss, however, point to verifiable portions of the context and argue that “Tell” is a possible composite of several heroes as well as an embodiment of the Swiss spirit.
In the Tell legend, Swiss beginnings are explained as a revolt against Habsburg injuries and insults to the self-respect of Swiss men, women, and children. In actuality, Habsburg tariffs and trade controls may have been equally important, as well as cantonal opposition in imperial politics. Certainly the immediate cause of war was the Schwyzois raid in January of 1314 on disputed properties at Einsiedeln, an abbey under Habsburg protection. The Habsburg imperial contender, Frederick the Fair, ordered an expedition to destroy the revolutionary movement.
Frederick’s brother, Duke Leopold I of Austria , therefore prepared a comprehensive attack in November of 1315. One Habsburg army made a wide right-flank swing from Lucerne via the Entlebuch and Brunig Pass to attack Unterwalden, while ships from Lucerne crossed the lake to harass the western shores of Schwyz. Duke Leopold collected a main army of more than two thousand knights and perhaps seven thousand infantry at Zug, and on the moonlit night of November 14-15 set out for Schwyz. Perhaps the road through Arth was blocked, or perhaps Leopold sought a “back door” surprise, but in any case, on November 15, his army marched southward along the eastern shore of Lake Aegeri and then continued south with the Aegerisee swamp on their right and Morgarten heights on their left. Apparently the aim was to cross the watershed to the Steiner valley and use the fairly level ground between Steinen and Schwyz for the battle that would defeat the rebels.
The knights headed a column stretching over more than half a mile of mediocre track, an obviously vulnerable situation, but an attack by untrained peasants was clearly not expected. About a mile south of Lake Aegeri, the knights were brought up short, either by a roadblock or rough footing. The spare narratives written later do not fit the present terrain exactly, but the main effect is clear. The defenders—thirteen hundred Schwyzois, two hundred from Uri, and others from Unterwalden—emerged from the forests along Morgarten heights, rolled boulders and tree trunks down the rocky slope of the Figlenfluh, and attacked on foot. In addition to using arrows, spears, clubs, and axes, the Swiss defenders used the halberd—a combination of spear, axe, and hook—to pull armored knights off their mounts. Surprised, the Austrian cavalry tried to deploy their undoubtedly panicked horses into a combat formation, but the narrow way gave no room for this. The battle was simply a running rout. In less than two hours, more than half the knights were killed, some drowning in the swamp or in Lake Aegeri, and the Habsburg army completely scattered. Duke Leopold survived only by flight and, demoralized, abandoned the unsuccessful flank attack on Unterwald.