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Roosevelt Announces a Second Front in Africa

White House News Release

Washington, D.C., November 7, 1942

In order to forestall an invasion of Africa by Germany and Italy, which if successful, would constitute a direct threat to America across the comparatively narrow sea from Western Africa, a powerful American force equipped with adequate weapons of modern warfare and under American Command is today landing on the Mediterranean and Atlantic Coasts of the French Colonies in Africa.

The landing of this American Army is being assisted by the British Navy and air forces and it will, in the immediate future, be reinforced by a considerable number of divisions of the British Army.

This combined allied force, under American Command, in conjunction with the British campaign in Egypt is designed to prevent an occupation by the Axis armies of any part of Northern or Western Africa, and to deny to the aggressor nations a starting point from which to launch an attack against the Atlantic Coast of the Americas.

In addition, it provides an effective second front assistance to our heroic allies in Russia.

The French Government and the French people have been informed of the purpose of this expedition, and have been assured that the allies seek no territory and have no intention of interfering with friendly French Authorities in Africa.

The Government of France and the people of France and the French Possessions have been requested to cooperate with and assist the American expedition in its effort to repel the German and Italian international criminals, and by so doing to liberate France and the French Empire from the Axis yoke.

This expedition will develop into a major effort by the Allied Nations and there is every expectation that it will be successful in repelling the planned German and Italian invasion of Africa and prove the first historic step to the liberation and restoration of France.

Great Events from History: The Twentieth Century, 1941-1970

Invasion of North Africa

by Stephen E. Ambrose, James J. Cooke

Date November 8, 1942

An Allied campaign designed to force the Germans out of North Africa provided a training ground for U.S. forces in World War II and prepared the way for the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy.

Also known as Operation Torch

Locale French North Africa (now Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia)

Categories World War II; wars, uprisings, and civil unrest

Summary of Event

On December 11, 1941, Germany and Italy declared war on the United States. Thereafter, the United States devoted its chief efforts to defeating its European enemies. Officers of the U.S. Army, however, disagreed with their British counterparts about how this aim should be accomplished. General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army, wanted to build up air and ground forces in the British Isles and then launch a cross-Channel invasion into France, aimed ultimately at Berlin. He hoped to be ready to invade late in 1942 and certainly by early 1943. The British leaders, especially Prime Minister Winston Churchill, favored a peripheral strategy designed to wear down Germany and Italy through air attacks and by striking at weak points on the frontiers of their empires. Churchill argued that only when the enemy was exhausted should the Allies cross the English Channel and confront the German army directly.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Marshall also believed that by concentrating on a cross-Channel operation, they could achieve several objectives. First, the operation would satisfy Soviet premier Joseph Stalin , who was urging the Allies to open a second front in Europe, which would take pressure off the beleaguered Russians. Second, such an attack would take the Germans by surprise and stimulate French resistance. In the long run, it was unrealistic to attack the powerful Germans on their home ground without preparation. The dangers of defeat were great, but it was imperative that the United States show its colors somewhere.

Roosevelt insisted that U.S. troops be in action against the Germans somewhere before the end of 1942. Invasion of France was not possible in 1942 because of a lack of landing craft and trained troops to staff them, so the Allies had to find an easier target. Churchill won the argument when the Allies decided that French North Africa was ideal for invasion. There were no German troops in that area, and it was probable that the Vichy French forces (set up as part of the French puppet state after France had surrendered to the Germans in June, 1940) would put up only token resistance against British and U.S. invaders.

At the other end of the North African landmass, the British Eighth Army was fighting General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps. An Allied landing in French North Africa would relieve the pressure on the British in Egypt and, it was hoped, make it possible to force the Germans out of North Africa altogether. Allied possession of North Africa would free the Mediterranean Sea for British shipping, so that oil from the Near East and supplies from India could come to the British Isles by the most direct route. Marshall argued that a landing in North Africa would delay an invasion of northern France by two years because of the drain on supplies, but Roosevelt overruled him.

The planning for the invasion, called Operation Torch, proved to be difficult. The United States preferred simultaneous landings in Morocco and Algeria, while the British wanted the operation to focus on the Algerian coastline alone. Both sides had good reasons. The United States wanted a foothold in Morocco, near Casablanca, if things went poorly in Algeria. Casablanca also would give the Allies a port that would not be subject to Axis air attacks. The British argued that if the landings did not include eastern Algeria, the Germans and Italians could quickly occupy all of Tunisia, using it as a base for air attacks and for a solid defensive position that would take many Allied lives to reduce.

By the end of August, the plans were in place, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower was firmly entrenched as the overall commander of the operation. In October, 1942, Major General Mark W. Clark and diplomat Robert Daniel Murphy were sent on a secret mission into North Africa to gauge the sentiments of the French forces there. Clark and Murphy ran head-on into French politics in North Africa. One problem was deciding which French general would lead the defection from Vichy and from collaboration with the Axis. It was clear that maverick General Charles de Gaulle would be unacceptable to French military leadership in North Africa. Admiral François Darlan, commander in chief of Vichy forces, was suspect because of his previous support for Vichy. It was agreed that General Henri Giraud would announce the landings and order Vichy troops not to resist the Allies. In another undercover operation, Giraud was brought to Gibraltar to confer with Eisenhower on the eve of the invasion. In the long run, Giraud’s selection did not settle French political problems in North Africa.

In the early morning of November 8, 1942, Eisenhower’s troops landed at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. General Giraud’s orders not to resist were too often ignored by French officers unaware of Giraud’s new role in French North Africa, and the aged Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, head of the Vichy government, ordered his forces to resist. Eisenhower, contacting Admiral Darlan, made the following arrangements: Darlan was to assume control of French North Africa and then would order his troops to cease fire preparatory to a later attack on the Germans. The U.S. press criticized Eisenhower for coming to terms with a pro-Fascist, but Churchill and Roosevelt supported him, especially when Eisenhower explained that the deal was necessary to avoid fighting the French and to begin the real job of fighting the Germans.

In November and early December, Eisenhower made a dash for Tunis, hoping to seize that port before the Germans could pour troops into Tunisia. Rain, superior German tank tactics, and German air superiority stalled his offensive before it reached its objective. The British Eighth Army, under General Bernard Lee Montgomery, was driving Rommel back. By February, 1943, Rommel had crossed Libya and reached southern Tunisia. He then turned against Eisenhower’s troops and inflicted a sharp blow on them at Kasserine Pass . The Allies, however, were building up their force, while the Germans received no significant reinforcements. By May 13, the last resistance had ended, and Eisenhower had captured nearly three hundred thousand prisoners in Tunisia.

Significance

As Marshall had feared, the large troop commitment to North Africa made a cross-Channel invasion in 1943 impossible. Because the troops and landing craft were already in the Mediterranean, they had to be used there. Despite Marshall’s concerns, Operation Torch did have a number of beneficial results. First, it established Eisenhower as a military planner and as an officer who could be a diplomat as well as a warrior. Second, it gave Eisenhower’s staff valuable training in planning and executing a complex mission that involved air, land, and sea components. Third, Operation Torch and subsequent fighting in North Africa allowed U.S. Army troops to train in realistic conditions. Fourth, Operation Torch was carried out successfully less than one year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, thereby showing the United States’ resilience, resolve, and combat potential.

On July 10, 1943, Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily, and the Allies soon captured the island. The fall of Sicily and the Allied bombing of Rome led to the downfall of the Italian head of government, Benito Mussolini, on July 25, 1943, and ultimately to an Italian surrender. Before the negotiations could be planned, however, the Germans had occupied the country. In September, U.S. troops invaded Italy. The progress of the Allied forces up the peninsula was slow; not until June 4, 1944, did the U.S. Fifth Army liberate Rome. The campaign that began with the invasion of North Africa had accomplished much, principally the freeing of the Mediterranean Sea and the elimination of Italy from the war.

Citation Types

Type

Format

MLA 9th

Ambrose, Stephen E., and James J. Cooke. "Invasion Of North Africa." Great Events from History: The Twentieth Century, 1941-1970, edited by Robert F. Gorman, Salem Press, 2008. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=GE20b_1561125022.

APA 7th

Ambrose, S. E., & Cooke, J. J. (2008). Invasion of North Africa. In R. F. Gorman (Ed.), Great Events from History: The Twentieth Century, 1941-1970. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.

CMOS 17th

Ambrose, Stephen E. and Cooke, James J. "Invasion Of North Africa." Edited by Robert F. Gorman. Great Events from History: The Twentieth Century, 1941-1970. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2008. Accessed September 15, 2025. online.salempress.com.

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