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Ethics: Questions & Morality of Human Actions, 3rd Edition

Wickedness

by Jeff Bell

Definition: Quality of desiring to do wrong for its own sake; evil

Type of ethics: Theory of ethics

Significance: Wickedness, far more than vice, is the precise opposite of virtue. It is the positive valuation of evil as its own reward.

The problem of evil is an ancient problem in philosophy and religion. In religion, the problem consists in explaining why God, who is all good, can allow for evil in the world; in philosophy, the problem entails accounting for the motives that lead people to do evil things. Socrates, for example, denies that people are motivated to do evil; he claims that people are motivated to do what is good and that it is only from ignorance of what is good that people do evil. Thus, people do not knowingly do wrong. Others have taken a similar stance with respect to God, arguing that God does not allow for evil and that it is only the inadequate and finite human knowledge of God that leads people to think that evil exists. Both these responses to the problem of evil, therefore, simply deny the existence of evil. In the philosophical discussion that has surrounded the topic of wickedness, however, there has been an acceptance of the fact that evil does indeed exist; because of this acceptance, the problem of why people are wicked (the problem of evil) reappears with all its force.

In Immanuel Kant’s article “Of the Indwelling of the Bad Principle Along with the Good” (1927), he argues that evil results when people are not properly motivated. By being properly motivated, Kant means that one should be motivated to act out of respect for the moral law (that is, universal moral principles), not from self-interest. It is when one’s moral principles followfrom one’s self-interest, and not the otherway around as it should be, that one can be wicked and evil. Despite this account of why people do evil, Kant nevertheless believes that evil actions are to be understood in the light of the good that motivates them—that is, the good as perceived in terms of self-interest rather than of the universal moral law. Kant consequently does not believe that people are ever wicked or do evil for the sake of wickedness or evil, and thus he is part of the tradition that denies the existence of evil as such.

Arthur Schopenhauer, in his book The World as Will and Representation (1818), denies the traditional rejection of evil and sets forth the notion of “pure wickedness” as an act done solely for the sake of evil. Citing the character Iago from William Shakespeare’s play Othello, Schopenhauer claims that people can be wicked because they derive disinterested pleasure from the suffering of others or because they are motivated to act by evil.

Types of Wickedness

S. I. Benn has set forth a more detailed typology and discussion of wickedness in his article “Wickedness” (1985). Benn cites two ways in which one can be wicked: either one is wicked in pursuing what one perceives to be good, or one is wicked in acting for the sake of evil. Benn further divides the first class of wickedness into “self-centered,” “conscientious,” and “heteronomous” wickedness. With self-centered wickedness, one acts in order to promote the interests of oneself or one’s family, company, or nation, but does so with a ruthless disregard for others. With conscientious wickedness, one believes that the good that one pursues is universally valid, not only valid for oneself, and pursues this good ruthlessly while excluding others. A Nazi, for example, may act according to a good that he or she believes to be universally valid, but will exclude others to the point of genocide. Heteronomous wickedness entails choosing to act according to another’s principles—principles that can be seen to be evil.

The second class of wickedness that Benn discusses, acting for the sake of evil, corresponds to Schopenhauer’s idea of “pure wickedness”; Benn labels it “malignity” or “unalloyed wickedness.” In discussing this class of wickedness, Benn turns to the problem of evil: Why are people wicked if they are not motivated by self-interest or by something that is thought of as good? Benn’s answer to this question consists largely of showing the inadequacy of attempts to subsume all evil actions under a motivation to do good; when it comes to stating why one would be motivated to do evil because it is evil, however, Benn for the most part avoids the issue.

The problem of why people are wicked, or why evil is pursued as an evil and not as a good, is the central theme of Mary Midgley’s book Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay (1984). Midgley argues that wickedness cannot be explained by referring it to external, social causes or by denying it exists. Wickedness, she argues, is a real potential that all people have. This potential results from what Midgley takes to be a perversion of natural hostilities and conflicts with others. Midgley claims that this perversion is not the same thing as Sigmund Freud’s concept of the “death-instinct” (which is an instinct that serves to bring about death and destruction). People have motives that aim toward negative, destructive ends (such as eliminating enemies and threats), and the perversion of such motives leads to the pursuit of negative ends for their own sake. In short, this perversion entails doing something evil simply because it is evil; it is, as Midgley and others have understood it, wickedness.

Further Reading

1 

Benn, S. I. “Wickedness.” In Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology, edited by John Deigh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

2 

Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. NewYork: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973.

3 

Kant, Immanuel. “Of the Indwelling of the Bad Principle Along with the Good.” In Kant’s Theory of Ethics, translated by T. K. Abbot. London: Longman, Green, 1927.

4 

Midgley, Mary. Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984.

5 

Milo, Ronald D. “Virtue, Knowledge, and Wickedness.” InVirtue andVice, edited by Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

6 

Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation. Translated by E. F. J. Payne. 2 vols. 1958. Reprint. New York: Dover, 1969.

7 

Waddell, Terrie, ed. Cultural Expressions of Evil and Wickedness: Wrath, Sex, Crime. New York: Rodopi, 2003.

Citation Types

Type
Format
MLA 9th
Bell, Jeff. "Wickedness." Ethics: Questions & Morality of Human Actions, 3rd Edition, edited by George Lucas & John K. Roth, Salem Press, 2019. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=Ethics_0075.
APA 7th
Bell, J. (2019). Wickedness. In G. Lucas & J. K. Roth (Eds.), Ethics: Questions & Morality of Human Actions, 3rd Edition. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.
CMOS 17th
Bell, Jeff. "Wickedness." Edited by George Lucas & John K. Roth. Ethics: Questions & Morality of Human Actions, 3rd Edition. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2019. Accessed October 22, 2025. online.salempress.com.