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Defining Documents in American History: Dissent and Protest

Speech Opposing the League of Nations

by Justus D. Doenecke, PhD

Date: 1919

Author: Henry Cabot Lodge

Genre: Speech

Summary Overview

Henry Cabot Lodge advocated a militant foreign policy, one based on the premise that the United States was a great power and should always act as such. At the same time he could also urge caution, as when he attacked President Woodrow Wilson in 1915 for engaging in a blundering and destructive intervention in Mexico. The president again met with Lodge’s scorn in February 1917 when Lodge condemned Wilson’s call for “peace without victory” in ending World War I and for seeking to create a binding league to enforce this peace; both policies, he claimed, were utterly unrealistic. Addressing his senatorial colleagues on February 28, 1919, in his Speech Opposing the League of Nations, Lodge critiques the Covenant of the League of Nations that Wilson had brought back from the Paris Peace Conference, stressing the dangers inherent in any indissoluble alliance.

Defining Moment

Although the United States had only been involved in the First World War since the spring of 1917, American contributions to the Allied victory and President Woodrow Wilson’s commitment to forging a lasting peace in Europe and throughout the world led to him having a seat at the table during treaty negotiations following the November 11, 1918 Armistice. In December 1918, Wilson sailed to Europe to participate in the Paris Peace Conference that would draft treaties with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria). On February 14 a special commission, over which the president presided, submitted a draft covenant for a proposed League of Nations to the conference’s plenary session. The League of Nations was an example of a collective security arrangement, working to defuse volatile situations through diplomacy and, hopefully, prevent future wars. The United States had never been part of a treaty system so extensive or permanent. Ten days later Wilson briefly returned to the United States, in part to defuse anticipated Senate criticism. Arriving in Boston, he gave a speech in Mechanics Hall in which he claimed that peace could not last a single generation unless it was guaranteed by all the civilized world.

As a result of the 1918 congressional elections, the Republicans had gained control of both houses of Congress. Lodge, who had become chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was quick to challenge the president.

Author Biography

Henry Cabot Lodge was born in Boston on May 12, 1850, the son of a wealthy Brahman merchant and shipowner. Lodge began his political career as a liberal independent, but finding such a reformist stance futile, he quickly became a Republican. In 1886 Lodge was elected to Congress, In 1893, the Massachusetts legislature elected Lodge to the Senate, where he backed such causes as immigration restriction, hard money, and economic protectionism. Yet when his close friend Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901, Lodge went along with most of Roosevelt’s more liberal domestic policies. Moderate change, he believed, was preferable to such radical measures as government ownership of public utilities.

Lodge was closer to Roosevelt on matters of foreign policy, which was always Lodge’s primary focus. A staunch defender of what was called the “large policy” (control of the Caribbean and parts of the Pacific and seizure of strategic islands like Cuba, Hawaii, and the Philippines), Lodge supported the U.S. navy flag officer Alfred Thayer Mahan in his desire to maximize naval strength. He opposed President Woodrow Wilson’s handling of relations with Mexico and when World War I broke out, Lodge strongly supported the allies (Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Romania, and Belgium), so much so that in May 1915, when the Lusitania was sunk, he called for severing diplomatic relations with Germany.

Although Lodge backed Wilson’s war measures when the United States entered the conflict, he bitterly fought the president once the war ended. As chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he strongly objected to Article 10 of the League of Nations covenant, which called for members to respect and preserve the independence and territorial integrity of all members. He feared that this would tie America’s hands to such a degree that vital decisions would be out of the control of Congress. Lodge died on November 9, 1924, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Historical Document

Mr. President, all people, men and women alike, who are capable of connected thought abhor war and desire nothing so much as to make secure the future peace of the world.…We ought to lay aside once and for all the unfounded and really evil suggestion that because men differ as to the best method of securing the world’s peace in the future, anyone is against permanent peace, if it can be obtained, among all the nations of mankind.…We all earnestly desire to advance toward the preservation of the world’s peace, and difference in method makes no distinction in purpose.…No question has ever confronted the United States Senate which equals in importance that which is involved in the league of nations intended to secure the future peace of the world. There should be no undue haste in considering it. My one desire is that not only the Senate, which is charged with responsibility, but that the press and the people of the country should investigate every proposal with the utmost thoroughness and weigh them all carefully before they make up their minds.…

In the first place, the terms of the league…must be so plain and so explicit that no man can misunderstand them.…The Senate can take no action upon it, but it lies open before us for criticism and discussion. What is said in the Senate ought to be placed before the peace conference and published in Paris, so that the foreign Governments may be informed as to the various views expressed here.

In this draft prepared for a constitution of a league of nations,…there is hardly a clause about the interpretation of which men do not already differ. As it stands there is serious danger that the very nations which sign the constitution of the league will quarrel about the meaning of the various articles before a twelvemonth has passed. It seems to have been very hastily drafted, and the result is crudeness and looseness of expression, unintentional, I hope. There are certainly many doubtful passages and open questions obvious in the articles which can not be settled by individual inference, but which must be made so clear and so distinct that we may all understand the exact meaning of the instrument to which we are asked to set our hands. The language of these articles does not appear to me to have the precision and unmistakable character which a constitution, a treaty, or a law ought to present.…Arguments and historical facts have no place in a statute or a treaty. Statutory and legal language must assert and command, not argue and describe. I press this point because there is nothing so vital to the peace of the world as the sanctity of treaties. The suggestion that we can safely sign because we can always violate or abrogate is fatal not only to any league but to peace itself. You can not found world peace upon the cynical “scrap of paper” doctrine so dear to Germany. To whatever instrument the United States sets its hand it must carry out the provisions of that instrument to the last jot and tittle, and observe it absolutely both in letter and in spirit. If this is not done the instrument will become a source of controversy instead of agreement, of dissension instead of harmony. This is all the more essential because it is evident, although not expressly stated, that this league is intended to be indissoluble, for there is no provision for its termination or for the withdrawal of any signatory. We are left to infer that any nation withdrawing from the league exposes itself to penalties and probably to war. Therefore, before we ratify, the terms and language in which the terms are stated must be exact and precise, as free from any possibility of conflicting interpretations, as it is possible to make them.

The explanation or interpretation of any of these doubtful passages is not sufficient if made by one man, whether that man be the President of the United States, or a Senator, or anyone else. These questions and doubts must be answered and removed by the instrument itself.

It is to be remembered that if there is any dispute about the terms of this constitution there is no court provided that I can find to pass upon differences of opinion as to the terms of the constitution itself. There is no court to fulfill the function which our Supreme Court fulfills. There is provision for tribunals to decide questions submitted for arbitration, but there is no authority to decide differing interpretations as to the terms of the instrument itself.…

I now come to questions of substance, which seem to me to demand the most careful thought of the entire American people, and particularly of those charged with the responsibility of ratification. We abandon entirely by the proposed constitution the policy laid down by Washington in his Farewell Address and the Monroe doctrine.…I know that some of the ardent advocates of the plan submitted to us regard any suggestion of the importance of the Washington policy as foolish and irrelevant.…Perhaps the time has come when the policies of Washington should be abandoned; but if we are to cast them aside I think that at least it should be done respectfully and with a sense of gratitude to the great man who formulated them. For nearly a century and a quarter the policies laid down in the Farewell Address have been followed and adhered to by the Government of the United States and by the American people. I doubt if any purely political declaration has ever been observed by any people for so long a time. The principles of the Farewell Address in regard to our foreign relations have been sustained and acted upon by the American people down to the present moment. Washington declared against permanent alliances.…He did not close the door on temporary alliances for particular purposes. Our entry in the great war just closed was entirely in accord with and violated in no respect the policy laid down by Washington. When we went to war with Germany we made no treaties with the nations engaged in the war against the German Government. The President was so careful in this direction that he did not permit himself ever to refer to the nations by whose side we fought as “allies,” but always as “nations associated with us in the war.”…Now, in the twinkling of an eye, while passion and emotion reign, the Washington policy is to be entirely laid aside and we are to enter upon a permanent and indissoluble alliance. That which we refuse to do in war we are to do in peace, deliberately, coolly, and with no war exigency. Let us not overlook the profound gravity of this step.

Washington was not only a very great man but he was also a very wise man. He looked far into the future and he never omitted human nature from his calculations.…He was so great a man that the fact that this country had produced him was enough of itself to justify the Revolution and our existence as a Nation. Do not think that I overstate this in the fondness of patriotism and with the partiality of one of his countrymen. The opinion I have expressed is the opinion of the world.…

But if we put aside forever the Washington policy in regard to our foreign relations we must always remember that it carries with it the corollary known as the Monroe doctrine. Under the terms of this league draft reported by the committee to the peace conference the Monroe doctrine disappears. It has been our cherished guide and guard for nearly a century. The Monroe doctrine is based on the principle of self-preservation. To say that it is a question of protecting the boundaries, the political integrity, or the American States, is not to state the Monroe doctrine.…The real essence of that doctrine is that American questions shall be settled by Americans alone; that the Americas shall be separated from Europe in purely American questions. That is the vital principle of the doctrine.

I have seen it said that the Monroe doctrine is preserved under article 10; that we do not abandon the Monroe doctrine, we merely extend it to all the world. How anyone can say this passes my comprehension. The Monroe doctrine exists solely for the protection of the American Hemisphere, and to that hemisphere it was limited. If you extend it to all the world, it ceases to exist,…Under this draft of the constitution of the league of nations, American questions and European questions and Asian and African questions are all alike put within the control and jurisdiction of the league. Europe will have the right to take part in the settlement of all American questions, and we, of course, shall have the right to share in the settlement of all questions in Europe and Asia and Africa.…Perhaps the time has come when it is necessary to do this, but it is a very grave step, and I wish now merely to point out that the American people ought never to abandon the Washington policy and the Monroe doctrine without being perfectly certain that they earnestly wish to do so. Standing always firmly by these great policies, we have thriven and prospered and have done more to preserve the world’s peace than any nation, league, or alliance which ever existed. For this reason I ask the press and the public and, of course, the Senate to consider well the gravity of this proposition before it takes the heavy responsibility of finally casting aside these policies which we have adhered to for a century and more and under which we have greatly served the cause of peace both at home and abroad.

Glossary

abrogate: renounce, go back on

“Article 10”: Controversial part of the League of Nations charter that called for a collective security agreement among League members, potentially committing them to military action.

Monroe Doctrine: American foreign policy principle that the United States bore responsibility for protecting the western hemisphere from European influence.

Document Analysis

Addressing his senatorial colleagues on February 28, 1919, Lodge first concedes the universal desire for a lasting peace—regardless of whether leaders differ on the best way to establish peace. He also asserts that the issue of whether or not to join the League of Nations is the most important question that the Senate has ever addressed and urges a thorough examination of the document and its implications for the United States and other member nations, suggesting that the Senate debate be provided to other participants at the peace conference.

Lodge then begins his critique of the agreement, noting that a “there is hardly a clause about the interpretation of which men do not already differ,” which carries with it the danger that the member nations will not even agree with each other about the meaning of the document. He points to its loose phrasing and equivocal language, which he finds inappropriate to what of necessity was a legal document. He also criticizes the charter’s use of rhetorical arguments and “historical facts,” asserting that this is not the language or style that should be used by a treaty. The greatest problem, however, is that the argument that the United States can “safely sign [the treaty] because we can always violate or abrogate” it later, if aspects are not to our liking. This kind of thinking, Lodge argues, undermines the entire purpose of a treaty and will create “dissension instead of harmony.” This is especially dangerous, he points out, because there is no language in the treaty which allows for a nation to leave the League of Nations; if leaving the agreement leads to war, it might be best, he implies, to not agree at all. He urges his colleagues to only ratify an agreement whose terms are “exact and precise, as free from any possibility of conflicting interpretations, as it is possible to make them” especially since there is no body (like our Supreme Court, he suggests) that will serve to settle disputes about the meaning of parts the document itself.

Far more important, Lodge notes that the covenant reverses the policy of George Washington by committing the United States to a binding alliance. The Washington Administration (1789-1797) was beset by international intrigue as the young United States attempted by maintain a neutral stance, especially with regard to conflicts between England and France. Washington’s parting advice to the nation was to avoid “entangling alliances” with foreign powers. Similarly, the Monroe Doctrine, with its stress upon the settling of American questions by Americans alone, was being violated. Of particular concern was Article 10 of the proposed league, which required members to preserve the integrity and independence of other member nations against acts of aggression. Article 10 frightened Lodge, since it committed the United States to involve itself in questions invoking Europe, Asia, and Africa. Article 10 carried with it the potential for the United States to be committed to overseas wars without the approval of Congress or orders of the President, superseding the Constitution. Also at issue for Lodge were matters involving Asia Minor, where there was soon talk of an American mandate for Constantinople and Armenia, and the Balkans, a region so full of ethnic and tribal rivalries that World War I itself had originated there. Similarly, European and Asian nations would be given the right to exercise police powers on the American continent, which authority even extended to the highly strategic Panama Canal. As Lodge saw it, the nation’s very sovereignty was at stake.

After he delivered this speech, Lodge fought a rearguard action against Wilson’s league. He drafted fourteen “reservations” to the covenant, the most important being one that Article 10 was inapplicable unless Congress were to uphold it by act or resolution Yet Lodge was not irreconcilable on the matter. He favored a society of nations; unlike the one envisioned by Wilson, however, Lodge’s lacked coercive powers. Because Wilson refused to accept Lodge’s reservations, the entire peace treaty went down to defeat, first in November 1919 and then again in March 1920.

Essential Themes

In many ways, Henry Cabot Lodge’s speech to the Senate on the League of Nations was an example of a reaction against the overseas crusading that had brought the United States into the first World War and to the negotiating table at Versailles. While many, including Lodge, believed that it was in American interests to support the Allied cause, the post-war developments desired by Wilson and other internationalists were a step too far for many American leaders.

What comes through in this excerpt of Lodge’s speech, however, is the degree to which his argument was based not only on the substance of the agreement (and the far flung adventures to which it might commit the United States) but also on the vague and unclear language of the document itself. “Statutory and legal language,” Lodge argues, “must assert and command, not argue and describe.” In connection with this, he raises the very practical question of who has the power to interpret this agreement. Lodge and his fellow Republican “irreconsilables” are often portrayed as “isolationist” but this speech makes clear that trepidation about American involvement abroad was only one of their concerns about the League of Nations.

Bibliography and Additional Reading

1 

Cooper, John Milton. Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the League of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

2 

Knock, Thomas J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

3 

Thomas, Evan. The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898 (New York: Hachette Digital, 2010).

4 

Widenor, William C. Henry Cabot Lodge and the search for an American foreign policy (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983)

Citation Types

MLA 9th
Doenecke, Justus D. "Speech Opposing The League Of Nations." Defining Documents in American History: Dissent and Protest, edited by Aaron Gulyas, Salem Press, 2017. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=DDProtest_0091.
APA 7th
Doenecke, J. D. (2017). Speech Opposing the League of Nations. In A. Gulyas (Ed.), Defining Documents in American History: Dissent and Protest. Salem Press. online.salempress.com.
CMOS 17th
Doenecke, Justus D. "Speech Opposing The League Of Nations." Edited by Aaron Gulyas. Defining Documents in American History: Dissent and Protest. Hackensack: Salem Press, 2017. Accessed May 30, 2026. online.salempress.com.