Back More
Salem Press

Table of Contents

The Criminal Justice System, 2nd Edition

People v. Nidal Hasan (2013)

The Case: Military court-martial for premeditated murder of thirteen Fort Hood soldiers

Date: Decided August 23, 2013

Criminal justice issues: Military justice; terrorism

Significance: The decision of the military tribunal highlighted the need for optimizing policies for countering internal threats and enabling commanders to become attuned to behavioral indicators that signal when individuals may commit violent acts or become radicalized.

Major Nidal Hasan, the U.S. Army psychiatrist who murdered thirteen soldiers and wounded thirty-two others in November 2009, was a “ticking time-bomb.” As a nation experiencing unprecedented threats of terrorism, the U.S. law enforcement and counterintelligence agencies had been warning citizens to be aware of the signals and overt behaviors that homegrown terrorists can exhibit. Unfortunately, the clear signals and overt behavior of Hasan were ignored, and, more importantly, ignored by a revered agency most likely to identify a terrorist—the U.S. Army.

Radicalization

The following is a brief review of the shooting event on November 5, 2009. Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist, was assigned to the Fort Hood deployment processing center where he interviewed soldiers being deployed to Afghanistan. His job was to interview soldiers to determine their mental health fitness for deployment. By his own admission, Hasan had become radicalized by November 5, 2009. Hasan chose November 5 because it was the day the units he was to deploy with to Afghanistan were scheduled to go through the processing center, and he would have the maximum number of targets to fire at. He brought with him an FN Five-seven pistol and a Smith and Wesson .357 magnum revolver, which he used to kill thirteen soldiers and wound another thirty-two.

He was tried by court-martial during which he served as his own defense and was found guilty. At the sentencing phase of the trial, he was sentenced to death. During the trial it became clear that Hasan wanted to be found guilty and become a martyr for radical Islam. Serving as his own defense, Hasan told the jury that he was the sole shooter and that the shootings were premeditated—presumably to obviate a conviction for anything less than premeditated murder. While in military prison awaiting execution, he declared lethal injection would make him a martyr.

Hasan sent message after message of his radicalization as a Muslim jihadist well before his murderous rampage at Fort Hood. The Washington Post reported that as an intern at Walter Reed Army Hospital a year and a half prior to the shootings, Hasan was tasked with giving a presentation on a medical topic of his choosing as a culminating exercise of his residency program. Instead of adhering to the requirement, Hasan prepared a slide presentation, titled “The Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military,” in which he lectured on Islam, suicide bombers, and threats the military could encounter from Muslims conflicted about fighting in the Muslim countries of Iraq and Afghanistan.” Ultimately, in this presentation, he advocated for the U.S. Army to offer conscientious objector status for U.S. Army Muslims who chose this option. He referred to Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, suicide bombers, and Iran. One slide read, “If Muslim groups can convince Muslims that they are fighting for God against injustices of the infidels, then Muslims can become a potent adversary, i.e., suicide bombing.”

There was clear evidence that Hasan had been communicating with the Yemen-based Iman Anwar al-Awlaki, who the National Security Agency (NSA) identified as a security threat to the United States. Hasan’s business cards also had the acronyms, “SoA(SWT).” U.S. intelligence agencies have identified “SoA” as “soldiers of Allah” and “SWT” as “glory to God” in Arabic. Moreover, as expressed in the special report prepared by the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, an instructor and peer both referred to Hasan as a “ticking time-bomb.” Not only was action not taken to discipline him, but also his officer evaluation reports sanitized his obsession with violent Islamist extremism into praiseworthy research on counterterrorism.

Reporting Suspicious Behavior

The question that defied logic was, “How could this officer whose evidence of radicalization was on full display to his superiors and peers slip through the Army’s detection of radical Islam and murder thirteen soldiers and wound an additional thirty-two?” The answer appears to be the “fear” on the part of Hasan’s Army officer superiors who believed that reporting their suspicions might result in a reprimand for religious intolerance or bias. This was revealed through interviews of Hasan’s superiors. Of course, this revelation reminds that “political correctness” must be trumped when considering reporting obvious radicalization or other suspicious behavior such as rants on social media, for example.

An historical example of a citizen’s suspicion paying off is the case of Bruno Hauptmann, the convicted killer of Charles Lindberg’s kidnapped son. Hauptmann purchased gas with a $10gold certificate, and the attendant thought this seemingly innocent act was strange. He wrote Hauptmann’s license plate number on the back of the gold certificate, and the FBI matched the serial number on the $10gold certificate to one of the gold certificates in the ransom. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) traced the license plate to Hauptmann’s car, and he was subsequently arrested, tried, and convicted. If Hasan’s superiors had reported their suspicions, it is possible that thirteen dead soldiers would be alive today, and thirty-two wounded soldiers would not be disabled.

James E. Guffey

Further Reading

1 

Gall, J. M. Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists: An Examination of Patterns in Domestic Lone Wolf Targets, Weapons, and Ideologies. 2014. ProQuest Database ID#1651237342.

2 

Gates, R. M. Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood. Department of the Army, Fort Hood Army Initial Review Team—Final Report. January, 2010. http://www.defense.gov/Portal/1/Documents/pubs/DOD-ProtectingTheForce_Security_HR_13Jan10.pdf.

3 

Kenber, B. Nidal Hasan Sentenced to Death for Fort Hood Shooting Rampage. August 28, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nidal-hasan-sentenced-to-death-for-fort-hood-shooting-rampage/2013/08/28/aad28de2-0ffa-11e3-bdf6-e4fcb77d94al_story.h tml?wpisrc=nl_headlines.

4 

Platoni, K. “The Army’s Fort Hood Disgrace.” The Wall Street Journal. March 19, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/kathy-platoni-the-armys-fort-hood-disgrace-1426806479.

5 

Priest, D. Fort Hood Suspect Warned of Threats Within the Ranks. November 10, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/09/AR2009110903618.html.

6 

U.S. Government’s Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack. U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. h t t p : / / w w w. h s g a c. s e n a t e. g o v / / i m o / m edia/doc/Fort_Hood/FortHoodReport.pdf?attempt=2.

See also Murders, mass and serial; Military justice; Terrorism.

Citation Types

Type
Format
MLA 9th
"People V. Nidal Hasan (2013)." The Criminal Justice System, 2nd Edition, edited by Hooper Michael K., Salem Press, 2017. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=CJ2E_0597.
APA 7th
People v. Nidal Hasan (2013). The Criminal Justice System, 2nd Edition, In H. Michael K. (Ed.), Salem Press, 2017. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=CJ2E_0597.
CMOS 17th
"People V. Nidal Hasan (2013)." The Criminal Justice System, 2nd Edition, Edited by Hooper Michael K.. Salem Press, 2017. Salem Online, online.salempress.com/articleDetails.do?articleName=CJ2E_0597.